ما الذي يريده السوريون؟
بيانات مسحية جديدة تكشف وعودًا ومخاطر تواجه حكومة البلاد الجديدة
سلمى الشامي ومايكل روبنز
5 ديسمبر 2025
سلمى الشامي هي مديرة الأبحاث في “الباروميتر العربي”.
مايكل روبنز هو المدير والمحقق الرئيس المشارك في “الباروميتر العربي”.
عام على سقوط الأسد
بعد عام واحد على سقوط الرئيس بشار الأسد، لا تزال سوريا بلدًا في طور الانتقال العميق. بنيتها التحتية مدمّرة إلى حدّ كبير، وتقدّر كلفة إعادة الإعمار بما يزيد على 200 مليار دولار. وهي تحتاج بشكل ملحّ إلى قوانين ومؤسسات تُسهِم في إعادة البناء، ومحاسبة مرتكبي جرائم الحرب، وضمان استجابة الحكومة الجديدة لمواطنيها. بمعنى آخر، على البلاد أن تعيد بناء نفسها في وقت تكافح فيه أساسًا من أجل العمل.
ولفهم أفضل السبل لإعادة بناء سوريا، يجب على قادتها وداعميها الدوليين فهم رغبات السكان واحتياجاتهم. لذلك، أجرى “الباروميتر العربي”—وهو شبكة بحثية غير ربحية نديرها—أول استطلاع رأي شامل في البلاد بين 29 أكتوبر و17 نوفمبر. بالتعاون مع الشريك المحلي RMTeam International، جمعنا 29 باحثًا ميدانيًا أجروا مقابلات مباشرة مع 1,229 مواطنًا بالغًا تم اختيارهم عشوائيًا في منازلهم. أُجريت المقابلات باللغتين العربية والكردية.
وتكشف النتائج عن أسباب للتفاؤل بشأن مستقبل سوريا: فالسوريون يأملون خيرًا، ويدعمون الديمقراطية، ومنفتحون على المساعدات الخارجية—including من الولايات المتحدة وأوروبا. كما أنهم يبدون ثقة بوضوح في الحكومة الحالية. لكن النتائج تكشف أيضًا عن أسباب للقلق: إذ يظهر استياء واسع من الوضع الاقتصادي ومن الخدمات العامة، ومخاوف كبيرة من الأمن الداخلي. يريد السوريون تصحيح مظالم الماضي—سواء قبل سقوط نظام الأسد أو بعده—لكنهم يختلفون بشأن أي المجموعات الدينية والإثنية تستحق الاعتراف الأكبر بمظلوميتها. كما تختلف شعبية الحكومة بشكل كبير بين المناطق. فالرئيس الجديد، أحمد الشرع، يتمتع بقبول عام جيد، لكنه يلقى تقييمات متدنية جدًا في المحافظات ذات الأغلبية من الأقليات.
وهكذا، أمام دمشق مهمة صعبة. لقد منحتها الشعبية الحالية فسحة زمنية للتغيير، لكن هذه “الفترة الذهبية” لن تدوم طويلًا، وستُقيَّم الحكومة قريبًا على أساس أدائها الفعلي. وإذا فشل الشرع وفريقه في تحسين المستوى المعيشي للسوريين قريبًا وفي إشراك كل مكونات المجتمع، فقد تتراجع الثقة بشكل حاد ويعود الاضطراب الداخلي بقوة.
أخبار جيدة… وأخرى سيئة
في السياسة، يمكن أن تتغير الانطباعات بسرعة. لكن الآن، تحظى الحكومة السورية الجديدة بمعدلات تأييد قد يحسدها عليها قادة كثيرون. فبحسب الاستطلاع، 81% من السوريين يثقون بالشرع. و71% يثقون بالحكومة الوطنية عمومًا. و62% يثقون بالقضاء، و71% يؤيدون الجيش.
ولا يبدو أن هذه الآراء ناتجة عن قمع سياسي؛ فقد عبّر كثير من منتقدي الحكومة عن آرائهم بصراحة للمقابلين. كما أن أغلبية واضحة ترى أن حرية التعبير (73%) وحرية الصحافة (73%) وحرية الاحتجاج السلمي (65%) متوفرة. في المقابل، يعتقد 53% فقط أن مجلس الشعب المنتخب حديثًا قادر على تمثيل مصالحهم، ويرى 40% فقط أن الحكومة شرحت العملية الانتخابية بوضوح ومنحت الجميع فرصًا متساوية. ومع ذلك، يؤمن 67% بأن الحكومة تستجيب بدرجة عالية أو معقولة لمطالب المواطنين.
ويمكن فهم هذا التفاؤل بسهولة. فقد جاءت القيادة الجديدة بعد حقبة طويلة وقاسية تحت حكم الأسد. ويقول 78% من السوريين إنهم تعرضوا لواحد أو أكثر من الأحداث الكارثية بين عامي 2011 و2024، مثل التهجير، ومصادرة أو تدمير الممتلكات، وتعطّل التعليم أو العمل، وفقدان أفراد الأسرة، أو التهديدات السياسية. بالمقابل، 14% فقط يقولون إنهم واجهوا أحداثًا مشابهة منذ بداية 2025. ويرى 50% أن الفساد ما زال منتشرًا، لكن 70% يرونه أقل سوءًا مما كان عليه سابقًا. ويعتقد 76% أن حياة أبنائهم ستكون أفضل من حياتهم، ويعتقد 76% أن سياسات الشرع ستكون أفضل من سياسات الأسد.
لكن مع مرور الوقت وتراجع ذاكرة السوريين عن عهد الأسد، سيبدأون في تقييم الشرع بناءً على الواقع الحالي. وهنا قد تظهر المشكلات: فالسوريون يعتبرون الاقتصاد مصدر القلق الأول. فقط 17% راضون عن أدائه. ويحدّدون التضخم (31%) والبطالة (24%) والفقر (23%) كأكبر تحديات البلاد. ويقول 56% إنهم يجدون صعوبة في تأمين احتياجاتهم الأساسية. ويشير 86% إلى أن دخل الأسرة لا يكفي لتغطية النفقات. ويعاني 65% من انعدام الأمن الغذائي، وترتفع النسبة إلى 73% بين النازحين داخليًا. كما يبدي السوريون عدم رضا واسعًا عن الخدمات العامة: الكهرباء (41%)، المياه (32%)، السكن الميسّر (35%)، والرعاية الصحية (36%).
وفي ما يتعلّق بالأمن، ورغم أن 94% يشعرون بالأمان في أحيائهم، فإن السوريين قلقون من انتشار السلاح خارج سلطة الدولة. 74% يريدون سحب السلاح من الجماعات المسلحة غير الرسمية، و78% يريدون سحبه من الأفراد غير المرخّص لهم. ويرى 63% أن الخطف تهديد خطير.
بلد منقسم
أخطر ما كشفته النتائج للحكومة الجديدة هو التفاوت الكبير في مستوى الدعم بين المناطق. فبينما تحظى القيادة بشعبية جيدة في معظم المحافظات، تتراجع ثقة المواطنين بشدة في اللاذقية والسويداء وطرطوس. فلا يثق بالحكومة سوى 36%، وبالقضاء 33%، وبالجيش 22%، وبالرئيس 36%. كما يرى أقل من نصف السكان أن لديهم حريات شخصية كافية: حرية التعبير (31%)، حرية الصحافة (34%)، وحرية التجمع (16%). ويعتقد 35% فقط أن الحكومة تستجيب لمطالبهم، و41% فقط راضون عن أدائها العام.
وتعكس هذه الأرقام انقسامات طائفية غذّاها نظام الأسد لسنوات طويلة. فاللاذقية وطرطوس ذات غالبية علوية، والسويداء ذات غالبية درزية، بينما يمثّل السنة العرب—وهم الأغلبية الديموغرافية—السلطة الحالية. خلال عام 2025، شهدت هذه المناطق أعمال قتل ونهب وانتقام ضد العلويين والدروز، وهو ما عزّز مخاوفهم من مستقبلهم في سوريا ما بعد الأسد.
ويُدرك السوريون هذا الخطر. إذ يعتقد 78% أن عدم التسامح يمثل مشكلة وطنية. وحين سُئلوا عن أهم درس تعلموه من أحداث 2011–2024، اختار 41% “قبول الآخر”. كما يرى أكثر من نصفهم (53%) أن الأغلبية والأقليات تحتاجان بنفس القدر إلى الشعور بالأمان، و51% يعتقدون أنه يجب احترام التفضيلات السياسية للجميع، و55% يرون ضرورة تمثيل كلا الطرفين في الحكومة.
لكن هذه النسب غير كافية لبناء إجماع واسع. بل إن هناك خلافات أكبر حول من يستحق اعترافًا أكبر بمعاناته. إذ يرى 40% أن معاناة الأغلبية والأقليات قبل 2024 تحتاج اعترافًا، لكن 38% يعتقدون أن الأغلبية وحدها تستحق اعترافًا أكبر.
لذلك تحتاج سوريا إلى نظام دقيق للعدالة الانتقالية. ويتطلب ذلك إصلاح “اللجنة الوطنية للعدالة” التي لا تزال تركز فقط على جرائم نظام الأسد، متجاهلة آلاف الجرائم التي ارتكبتها جماعات أخرى. لكن 70% من السوريين يريدون أن تشمل العدالة كل الانتهاكات. كما أن 91% يرفضون العنف خارج القانون.
ويبقى بناء آليات قضائية عادلة شرطًا ضروريًا، لكن بلدًا مستقرًا يحتاج أيضًا إلى الديمقراطية. و71% من السوريين يعتقدون أن الديمقراطية—رغم عيوبها—أفضل من البدائل. كما يرفض 57% فكرة “القائد القادر على تجاوز القوانين لإنجاز الأمور”.
المساعدة الخارجية
رغم أهمية الإصلاح الداخلي، فإن السوريين لا يريدون خوض التجربة وحدهم. إذ يرغب 80% بالحصول على مساعدات خارجية اقتصادية أو تنموية. ويُنظر بإيجابية إلى السعودية (87%) وقطر (83%)، تليهما تركيا (73%). ويحظى أردوغان بتأييد 69% بسبب دعمه للشرع وحركة “هيئة تحرير الشام” التي أسهمت في إسقاط الأسد—لكن هذا التأييد ينخفض إلى 38% بين أبناء الأقليات.
ويرى 70% من السوريين الاتحاد الأوروبي بشكل إيجابي، و66% ينظرون إيجابًا إلى الولايات المتحدة، و61% ينظرون إيجابًا إلى الرئيس الأميركي دونالد ترامب، ربما بسبب رفعه للعقوبات على سوريا. لكن 14% فقط يدعمون التطبيع مع إسرائيل، و92% يرون سياساتها تهديدًا خطيرًا. ويحصل كل من إيران (5%) وروسيا (16%) على نسب تأييد منخفضة للغاية.
ورغم هذا، يظل أمام واشنطن والغرب فرصة حقيقية لدعم إعادة بناء سوريا—إذا تحركوا بسرعة.
نافذة قد لا تبقى مفتوحة
السوريون سعداء بالتخلّص من نظام الأسد، ومتفائلون بالمستقبل، لكنهم يشعرون بقلق عميق تجاه الحاضر. توجد فرصة تاريخية لبناء سوريا أفضل—لكن هذه النافذة ستُغلق سريعًا إذا لم تتخذ الحكومة الجديدة والمجتمع الدولي خطوات ملموسة لتحسين حياة الناس واستعادة الثقة…
المصدر سلمى الشامي هي مديرة الأبحاث في “الباروميتر العربي”.
What Syrians Want New Survey Data Shows the Promises and Perils Facing the Country’s New Government Salma Al-Shami and Michael Robbins December 5, 2025 At a protest in support of Syrian territorial unity in Damascus, Syria, November 2025 At a protest in support of Syrian territorial unity in Damascus, Syria, November 2025 Yamaml Al Shaar / Reuters SALMA AL-SHAMI is Director of Research at Arab Barometer. MICHAEL ROBBINS is Director and Co-Principal Investigator at Arab Barometer. More by Salma Al-Shami More by Michael Robbins Listen Share & Download Print Save Ayear after the fall of President Bashar al-Assad, Syria remains a country very much in transition. Much of its infrastructure is in tatters, and the price tag for rebuilding the war-torn state stands at over $200 billion. It is in desperate need of laws and institutions that can facilitate reconstruction, hold war criminals to account, and ensure that the new government is responsive to its citizens. The country, in other words, must remake itself at a time when it is struggling to function. To figure out how Syria can best rebuild, its leaders and international supporters must understand the wants and needs of the country’s citizens. And so from October 29 to November 17, Arab Barometer—a nonprofit research network that we help direct—conducted its first ever survey of Syria’s people. Together with a local partner, RMTeam International, we gathered 29 interviewers and had them speak with 1,229 randomly selected adults in person, in each participant’s place of residence. The surveyors spoke in both Arabic and in Kurdish. Our results provide reasons to be optimistic about Syria’s future. We found that the country’s people are hopeful, supportive of democracy, and open to foreign assistance—including from the United States and Europe. They approve of and trust their current government. But our results also provide reasons for concern. For starters, Syrians are broadly unhappy with the state of the economy and with public services. They are worried about internal security. They want to right past wrongs—those that happened both before and after the fall of the Assad regime—yet they disagree about which ethnic and religious group’s suffering is most deserving of attention. Finally, the government’s popularity varies wildly by region. Ahmed al-Shara, the country’s new president, is liked overall. But he and his team suffer from low ratings in some governorates dominated by the country’s minorities. Damascus thus has a tough task ahead. The new government has bought itself time to transform the country for the better, thanks to its favorable ratings. But eventually, the honeymoon will end, and the government will be judged by its own performance. If Shara and his team cannot make Syrians more prosperous in the near future and engage all of the country’s citizens, their ratings might plummet, and Syria’s internal strife could come back with a vengeance. Subscribe to Foreign Affairs This Week Our editors’ top picks, delivered free to your inbox every Friday. Enter your email here. Sign Up * Note that when you provide your email address, the Foreign Affairs Privacy Policy and Terms of Use will apply to your newsletter subscription. GOOD NEWS, BAD NEWS In politics, perceptions can change quickly. But for now, Syria’s new government has approval ratings that should make other world leaders envious. According to our survey, 81 percent of Syrians are confident in Shara. Seventy-one percent are confident in the national government as a whole. Sixty-two percent are confident in the courts and the legal system, and 71 percent support the army. These positive responses do not appear to simply be the result of political repression. Many of the government’s critics were not shy in their remarks with our interviewers. Yet healthy majorities of Syrians agree that they have freedom of speech (73 percent), freedom of the press (73 percent), and the freedom to participate in peaceful protests (65 percent). A smaller number—53 percent—are confident that the newly elected People’s Council, the country’s unicameral parliament, will represent their interests. Just 40 percent believe that the government explained the election process for parliamentarians clearly and gave everyone an equal opportunity to compete. But nonetheless, 67 percent of Syrians agree that the government is very responsive or largely responsive to what people want. It isn’t hard to see why Syrians are enthusiastic. The country’s current leadership has been in power for just over a year, and people are comparing its nascent record to Assad’s lengthy, brutal tenure. Seventy-eight percent of Syrians report experiencing one or more life-upending challenges between 2011 and 2024, such as displacement, the confiscation or destruction of property, the disruption of livelihoods or education, the deaths of family members, or political intimidation or harassment. In comparison, just 14 percent report experiencing one or more of the same challenges since the start of 2025. Fifty percent of citizens believe that corruption currently plagues national state agencies and institutions, but 70 percent see it as less widespread than it was under Assad. Seventy-six percent believe their children’s lives will be better than their own. It thus follows that 76 percent of Syrians think that Shara’s policies will be better for Syria than those of his predecessor. But eventually, memories of Assad will fade, and Syrians will begin to evaluate Shara by how they feel contemporaneously. And when they do, Syria’s new government may find itself in trouble. Syrians most commonly cite the economy as their main political concern, and just 17 percent are happy with its performance. Inflation (31 percent), a lack of jobs (24 percent), and poverty (23 percent) were cited as the most serious challenges facing the country, when citizens were given a menu of choices. On an individual level, 56 percent of Syrians report that securing their basic needs is difficult. A staggering 86 percent suggest that their net household income does not cover their expenses, and 77 percent of citizens are dissatisfied with the efforts of governing authorities—although this is not always the national government—in generating employment. Food insecurity affects an alarming share of citizens, with 65 percent of all Syrians and 73 percent of self-described internally displaced persons reporting that in the last 30 days, they often or sometimes ran out of food before having the money to buy more. Likewise, most Syrians are deeply unhappy with the state of public infrastructure. Fewer than half of all Syrians are satisfied with the provision of electricity (41 percent) and water (32 percent), the availability of affordable housing (35 percent), and the health-care system (36 percent). Finally, Syrians remain worried about their security. Although almost all Syrians—94 percent—report feeling safe in their own neighborhoods, they list the need to secure a monopoly over the use of force as the second-biggest challenge facing the country. Most Syrians want the government to collect weapons from armed nonstate groups (74 percent) and unauthorized individuals (78 percent). They view such arms as critical threats. Kidnapping is seen as a critical threat by 63 percent of citizens. A HOUSE DIVIDED Yet perhaps the most concerning finding for Syria’s government, which is still trying to unify the country, is that its backing is geographically uneven. The state’s leadership is popular in most governates. But in Latakia, Sweida, and Tartus, far fewer have confidence in the national government (36 percent), the courts (33 percent), the army (22 percent), and the president (36 percent). Syrians living in these three governorates also do not believe that they have extensive personal freedoms. Far less than half think that freedom of speech (31 percent), the press (34 percent), and assembly (16 percent) are guaranteed. Meanwhile, just 35 percent of people in these areas believe the government is responsive to their needs, and only 41 percent are satisfied with the national government’s performance. These numbers likely reflect sectarian divisions that were cultivated by the Assad regime and have continued to fester after its fall. Latakia and Tartus are home to large shares of the country’s Alawites, and Sweida is home to the largest share of its Druze population: two of Syria’s numerous ethnoreligious minorities. Assad’s government was dominated by Alawites and systematically privileged and co-opted both its own group and certain other minority communities, including, at times, the Druze (although no group was, or is, monolithic in its allegiances). Assad largely repressed and systematically excluded Syria’s Sunni Arab majority from the same preferential treatment. Now, however, this ethnoreligious majority holds power, and it has not provided sufficient protection or inclusion for Syria’s other communities. Throughout 2025, there have been retaliatory killings, lootings, and massacres against Alawites in Latakia and Tartus and against the Druze, validating these groups’ worst fears about life in post-Assad Syria. Syrians are keenly aware of this sectarian challenge. Seventy-eight percent believe that intolerance of others is a problem affecting the country. They want to build a more inclusive Syria. When asked to name the most important lesson from the events of 2011 to 2024 (the years of Syria’s uprisings), a plurality—41 percent—cited the acceptance of one another and of one another’s differences. We asked Syrians about who most needed assurance with regard to their safety, political preferences, and acknowledgment of injustices suffered before and after 2024. A little over half—53 percent—agreed that both the majority and minorities equally need to feel secure. Fifty-one percent agreed that both the majority and minorities need to have their political preferences respected by other Syrians, and 55 percent agreed that both the majority and minorities should be represented in the government. Syria needs a carefully crafted system of transitional justice. But these figures are hardly overwhelming. And there is even less consensus on which communities deserve justice. Pluralities of Syrians believe that the pre- and post-2024 suffering of both Syria’s majority and minorities are in need of recognition (40 percent pre-2024, 31 percent post-2024). But a notable share, 38 percent, believe that the injustices suffered by Syria’s majority pre-2024 requires more acknowledgment. Syria will thus need a carefully crafted system of transitional justice. This will likely require reforming the country’s existing national justice commission. Right now, that commission is tasked with investigating crimes, holding perpetrators accountable, compensating victims, and promoting reconciliation exclusively for wrongs committed by Assad’s regime. It thus leaves out the thousands of killings and atrocities committed by other armed groups. Thankfully for the state’s future, 70 percent of Syrians believe the commission should also cover these crimes. And overwhelming majorities of Syrians are opposed to extrajudicial violence. Just nine percent believe extrajudicial measures lead to fairer resolutions, and just 19 percent believe they lead to faster ones. Creating a better judicial mechanism will do much to tamp down sectarian tensions. Yet to build a truly stable and fair country, Syria will need to become a democracy. Most Syrian citizens do not see the current government as terribly democratic, but 71 percent believe democracy, despite its problems, is better than the alternatives. Fewer than half (43 percent) agreed with the statement, “This country needs a leader who can bend the rules if necessary to get things done.” HELP WANTED Building a prosperous, inclusive, and democratic Syria is no doubt a very tall order. But the country doesn’t have to go it alone, and it doesn’t want to. According to our survey, most Syrians are open to aid from other countries. When given a menu of options, around 80 percent identified the need for external economic assistance of some kind: 45 percent wanted economic development aid, and 36 percent wanted assistance with the rebuilding of infrastructure. Only four percent indicated they didn’t want assistance at all. Damascus has many potential partners that would have popular legitimacy. Saudia Arabia and Qatar top the list, with favorability ratings of 87 percent and 83 percent, respectively—perhaps a reflection of the millions of dollars each has given or pledged to give Syria. Turkey comes in third, at 73 percent. A very similar percentage, 69 percent, has a favorable opinion of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s foreign policies—which suggests that most approve of his support for Shara and the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement that Shara founded and that helped overthrow the Assad regime. But this feeling is not universal. Only 38 percent of those who self-identify as a member of a minority have a favorable view of Erdogan, compared with 81 percent of those who do not identify as such. As with views about domestic politics, there are important divisions within Syria on views about foreign relations. Syrians across multiple identities, however, are supportive of Europe and Washington. Seventy percent of citizens, including 66 percent of those who self-define as minorities, have a favorable view of the European Union. A similar number, 66 percent, have a favorable view of the United States, including 60 percent of self-identified minorities. Sixty-one percent of citizens have a positive view of U.S. President Donald Trump himself. This figure is strikingly high for the region, where Trump is generally disliked. But it makes sense. Not long after taking office, Trump lifted the punishing economic sanctions Washington had placed on Syria. Trump’s ratings, however, do not mean Syrians support his quest to build ties between their country and Israel. In fact, only 14 percent of Syrians support normalizing relations. Almost all (92 percent) see Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories and strikes on Iran, Lebanon, and Syria as critical threats to their security. Just four percent have a favorable opinion of Israel, similar to the five percent who support Iran and the 16 percent who support Russia—the two countries that most directly backed Assad’s regime. These findings suggest that Trump should drop his quixotic push, which risks placing Syria’s current government in direct opposition to the preferences of the vast majority of its citizens. Instead, the United States and its allies will have more success if they continue to provide Syria with the financial and technical assistance it needs to rebuild and address its internal social challenges. By doing so, they can help the state become a stable U.S. partner in a critical region for American interests. (The United States and its allies appear to have an edge over China in Syria, which only 37 percent of citizens support.) To succeed, however, Washington must act quickly. So, too, must Syria’s government. The country’s people are glad that the Assad regime is gone. They are hopeful about what might come next. Yet they are still wary of the future and unhappy with the present. There is an opportunity to build a better Syria. But the window won’t stay open forever.