Boosting the slim odds of a “two-state solution” is not an easy task. At the very least, we must consider the heavy encumbrance created by the presence of armed settlers in the occupied territories, as well as the Palestinians’ lack of a popular and dynamic political instrument. Of course, we also have the mutual hatred of the two sides, which has multiplied over the past few months.
However, is it not telling that neither of the two conflicting parties, neither the Israeli government nor Hamas, has a post-war plan, which makes this a lack the two have in common? Doesn’t this tell us that perpetual war, or a similar formula that suspends and excludes politics, might actually be their “plan”?
We could argue that the two-state solution might be possible, not because of its own force – it is very weak – but in comparison with all the other “solutions,” both explicit and implied.
Permanent war is, of course, not a solution. Indeed, neither the people of the region, nor the economies of its countries, nor the patience of the outside world, in the Arab region and beyond, would be willing to tolerate and live with such a “solution.”
However, a radical and decisive end to the conflict, and the radical victory and defeat it would give rise to, is not, in turn, a solution, and it will probably never happen.
A sweeping Israeli victory, even if it is achieved militarily and kills the possibility of two states, would not fulfill the criteria in full, and it would not be sustainable: within Israel itself, there is a growing weariness about the prospect of living “by the sword” forever, and Israel would be doomed, in that event, to live by the sword forever.
Indeed, it would live in fear and terror: afraid of its Arab population, which is over one-fifth of the total Israeli population and whose birth rates higher than those of Jewish Israelis, afraid of the legitimate aspirations for liberation and the rage among Palestinians in the rest of historical Palestine that inherently comes with having those aspirations suppressed, afraid it would be left with no friends among its Arab neighbors, afraid that its current friends could denounce their embarrassing friendship with it, afraid of global shifts that are not going in its favor, and thus, also afraid of every new generation of youths in the United States and Europe, where demands for justice and equality are ramping up while demands for power and the appetite for hubris are decreasing.
Indeed, Israel would even fear that Western regimes could themselves become unwilling to continue supporting it if it does not genuinely engage in a serious peace process.
Another fear the Jewish state would not be able to dispel is that of its economy failing to finance a constant state of war, which necessitates keeping its army on constant alert and its forces constantly ready for deployment. We know that economic constraints were the primary reason for Europe’s loss of its colonies after World War II. However, with regard to Israel in particular, an economic slowdown could also accelerate the aggravation of intra-Jewish disputes, which were vividly illustrated by the weekly pre-October 7 Saturday protests.
As for a sweeping victory over Israel that achieves what easy talk calls “the liberation of Palestine,” it is not a solution either. The Israelis, at the end of the day, have developed a nuclear weapon intended for such mortal prospects.
However, before that, what regime does an organization like Hamas promise its people in the event of a decisive victory, and what is its framework for dealing with the Jews of Palestine? Can the region and the world tolerate such a Hamas victory? What impact would this victory have on the mosaic of sectarian and ethnic tensions in the Arab Levant? We could also add that any reconstruction process in Gaza would undermine, or potentially negate, this victory, given what the actors capable of financing this reconstruction stand for, which is antithetical to everything the Islamic movement represents.
The fact is whichever way we look at it, prospects are extremely bleak. That is why we saw the Israeli historian Moshe Zimmerman, who opposes the actions of his government, call the alternative to the “logical” two-state solution as Nazi-like actions by Israelis against the Palestinians or by the Palestinians against the Israelis.
Past experiences do not encourage us to refute this assumption. Successive wars in the Arab world have been fought by various classes and groups: from the class of traditional notables in 1948, to the armies of the middle class in 1967 and 1973, to the populist and religious forces of this century. These attempts all ended in tragedy, and the number of countries and peoples taking part consistently decreased.
Almost the exact same could be said about Israel, which fought with Zionist gangs in 1948, then fought subsequent wars through a state that was primarily run by Western Ashkenazi Jews, and it is now fighting through a state in which Easterners – Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews – as well the fanatical parties of religious parties, also take part in making decisions.
The threats looming over the Israeli horizon remain, posing greater risks than ever before and giving rise to questions that had never been asked, about whether Zionism has the capacity to solve the Jewish question.
It is true that an argument by negation, highlighting the fact that alternatives are not feasible, as well as their ugliness, does not suffice to prove that an option is valid and practical, especially in light of the weakness of the forces promoting peace and defending the “two-state solution” on both sides. However, the negative argument could nonetheless help prove another testimony to the fact that a dark phase awaits, even if it fails to prove that there is a way out.
